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Splendid Associations of Favored Individuals: 
Federal and State Commercial Banking Policy in the Federalist Era
1. Introduction
In his study of the development of American law, historian Lawrence Friedman (1993)
reminded us that the Bill of Rights applies only to the federal government, not the states. Although
the Virginia Declaration of Rights predated the Bill of Rights by 13 years and provided its
philosophical underpinnings, the direction of influence was from federal to state levels. Many states
simply copied the first ten amendments to the Constitution when drafting their own constitutions.
The hypothesis offered here is that the same federal-to-state line of influence is evident in early
American banking law and policy. Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Maryland and New York chartered
banks prior to Congress’s charter of the Bank of the United States in 1791. Yet it was the Bank of
the United States charter that served as a model for most subsequent bank charters. 
The transition was not seamless. To many late-eighteenth and early nineteenth century
Americans, banking was something to be entered into with caution if at all. Henry Clay, an
otherwise ardent spokesman for pro-growth internal improvements such a roads, turnpikes and
canals, was less enthusiastic about banks, which were viewed by some others as vital infrastructure.
During Congressional debate in 1811, Henry Clay labeled the Bank of the United States a “splendid
association of favoured individuals invested with exemptions and surrounded by immunities and
privilege” (quoted in Dorfman1946, p. 341). Clay’s distaste for the bank sprang not just from a-3-
western agrarian’s conception of banks as promoters of speculation and sharp dealing. Rather, his
distaste sprang from a more general view of the corporation as an instrument of oppression capable
of robbing the country of its hard-won republicanism. Americans had fought a war to rid itself of
aristocratic privilege. Corporations smacked of a return to government sanction of privilege.
Lamoreaux (1997) and Dunlavy (2006) argue that early American firms were shaped by
contemporary social conceptions of appropriate horizontal power relations inside the firm and the
Federalist era bank, as a corporation, was shaped by those conceptions. But the debate was much
broader than how partners or shareholders would treat with one another. Contemporary Americans
who had no direct stake in the business corporation took great interest in its internal governance
because rules for how the elite – and make no mistake about it, the elite controlled America’s
earliest financial corporations – shared power within the corporate body politic spoke to their
attitudes toward sharing power in the wider civic polity. 
Incorporating a bank or other business enterprise in the Federalist period was contentious
because of different beliefs about the nature of governance. Was governance to be plutocratic or
democratic? It was within this debate that the first banks were established and this debate influenced
how banks were governed, which ultimately influenced how banks did their business. The political
debates surrounding the establishment of the Bank of North America (1782) and the Bank of the
United States (1791) defined these banks and nearly every bank chartered thereafter up to the mid-
1830s and beyond. Specifically, the liberal Bank of North American charter that imposed few
meaningful restrictions on the bank’s operation, accountability or governance gave way to the Bank
of the United States’s more restrictive charter that sharply limited its operations, made it accountable
to government, and defined many of its internal governance procedures. Subsequent state charters-4-
were more closely modeled on the Bank of the United States model than the Bank of North America
model. And, as all students of early American history are aware, concerns with the role of the
corporation, especially the large corporation, remained unresolved until well after Jackson’s war on
the second Bank of the United States. 
Section 2 describes the conditions under which the Bank of North America was established
and how the terms of its original charter came under attack less than three years after the bank’s
formation. The debate over the bank reflected contemporary concerns with the relationship between
economic and political power. Because the bank’s managers were unrepentant defenders of a
plutocraticly organized bank, its charter was revoked. Although the charter was reinstated within
two years, the bank implemented several new internal procedures that smacked less of privilege and
plutocracy. Section 3 demonstrates how the debate in the mid-1780s over the Bank of North
America influenced the features of the Bank of the United States’s charter. Alexander Hamilton was
aware of the concerns expressed in the earlier debate and tailored the charter of the Bank of the
United States to deflect many of those concerns. Hamilton’s plan, crafted in response to
contemporary concerns, became the model of bank charters from Maine to Mississippi. Thus, the
line of influence in Federalist bank policy ran, as Friedman might have expected, from the federal
to the state level.
2. The Bank of North America: The Debate on Corporate Privilege is Joined
The Bank of North America (hereafter BONA) was born of crisis. In spring 1781 the English
army was moving easily through the South. The currency was depreciated to the point of near
collapse, Congress had exhausted its fiscal resources, patriotic fervor had given way to frustration,1 Morris originally believed that the BONA’s profits would be sufficient to retire the
Congressional debt and envisioned refunding the debt and financing it through a sinking fund
made up of the bank’s profits. Riesman (1987, p. 144) argues that Morris formulated this plan
after reading the work of the English Whig Richard Price, who in 1772 formulated a comparable
plan for extinguishing Britain’s massive debt. 
-5-
and American morale sank lower by the day. Facing a grave situation, Congress centralized the army
and other administrative departments. It also created the office of the Superintendent of Finance and
appointed Robert Morris to the post. The new superintendent was the second most powerful figure
in the reorganized government, second only to George Washington, and was granted almost
complete control over fiscal policy (Rappaport 1970). 
Morris’s entered his post with a sweeping vision of fiscal reform (Riesman 1987).   Morris’s
public finance plan featured a bank as its centerpiece, a bank that was to provide assistance during
the war and contribute to the country’s postwar prosperity.
1 In addition to the bank, Morris asked
for new domestic taxes and import tariffs. Although integral to the entire proposal’s success,
Morris’s revenue plan met stiff resistance. Rhode Island’s David Howell, an articulate spokesman
for local sovereignty, convinced the powerful Virginia and New York delegations to defeat Morris’s
tax measures. 
With taxes and tariffs shelved for the moment, Morris’s plan now turned exclusively on the
bank. Rappaport (1970) contended that Morris unveiled his banking plan so quickly after assuming
office that he must have contemplated it long before. Morris later claimed that he had a plan for a
commercial bank before the war, but hostilities forced him to set them aside (Carey 1786). We also
know that Hamilton, while still a member of Washington’s staff, twice wrote to Morris with bank
proposals. But Morris thought Hamilton’s schemes too bold, too audacious – one called for a bank
of $200 million capital – and proposed a more modest institution. Morris’s plan called for a bank-6-
with just $400,000 in capital, divided into $400 shares. The difference between Hamilton and Morris
on the bank was that Hamilton envisioned a bank as an arm of government that might serve
commercial interests; Morris envisioned the bank as arm of commerce that might serve the
government. It did not occur to Morris that the government would own shares, perhaps because the
government was effectively bankrupt and more in need of capital than a supplier of it.
Subscriptions came in slowly. By October 1781 only $70,000 had been subscribed so that
the third, and remaining pillar of Morris’s three-pillared plan appeared to be in doubt. The arrival
of a French frigate with $470,000 in specie to support the revolutionary cause afforded Morris the
opportunity to subscribe to the bank’s capital on the government’s behalf. After providing the army
with supplies, Morris invested the remaining $254,000 in BONA stock. When another $15,000 in
private investment came in, Morris applied for a Congressional charter of incorporation.
Congress chartered the bank on 31 December 1781, but lingering concerns over whether it
actually had the power to do so led it to ask states to enact similar supporting legislation (Lewis
1882). Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey and North Carolina all
passed enabling legislation. It was not until Morris petitioned the Pennsylvania legislature for a
charter that serious concerns were raised. Critics feared the consequences of the original grant’s
concession of a perpetual charter and its right to amass up to $10 million in assets. The latter was
troublesome because it held the potential for the establishment of a “monied aristocracy;” the former
was equally troublesome because a perpetual charter placed this large and potentially dangerous
institution beyond legislative control. Neither argument got traction. Despite concerns voiced by
some legislators, the usually vociferous press’s silence as well as the few references to the bank in
the politicians’ correspondence are notable. -7-
Except for the profits earned in its early years, the BONA did not become noteworthy until
1785, when the bank’s operations and its charter provoked a larger debate over the meaning of
democracy and the corporation’s place within it. The opening shot was fired at the bank in an
advertisement that appeared in the Pennsylvania Evening Herald on 23 February 1785. It informed
the public of a petition asking for repeal of the bank’s charter. Legislative speeches for and against
the bank followed and a bill to repeal the charter was drafted. The spring 1785 legislative session
ended without the Assembly taking action. When the Assembly reconvened in the autumn the debate
resumed and an act repealing the BONA’s charter passed in September 1785, less than four years
after Congress had chartered it.
What had the bank done to turn the Assembly against it? To many legislators the better
question was what hadn’t the bank done. Hammond (1957, p. 53) listed the sundry charges leveled
against the bank: it encouraged usury; it refused to lend on long terms to farmers; it refused to lend
on mortgage security, again, to farmers; it insisted on punctuality in meeting one’s debts to the bank;
it allowed foreigners (which included not only Europeans, but individuals from neighboring states)
to invest in the bank; and, it demonstrated favoritism to certain borrowers, mostly shareholders. The
bank’s real sins, however, were its opposition to the chartering of a rival institution, its opposition
to the state’s emission of £100,000 in bills of credit to meet debt obligations, its refusal to accept
notes issued by a £50,000 loan office, or land bank and, above all, its adoption of high-pressure
lobbying practices against all three otherwise popular (and populist) measures. 
Morris was quick to defend his bank and denied that its actions in any way undermined
democratic institutions. But his arguments failed to sway many critics because he was also quick to
point out that it had been established on the idea that it could lend to whomever it saw fit. Reisman2 The federal government had repaid its large loans to the bank by selling off the interest
it took when Morris subscribed to $254,000 in stock on its behalf. 
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(1987, p. 148) observed that Morris was blind “to charges that the bank was a monopoly favoring
some and not others” and he failed to grasp why others cared so deeply about the larger issues raised
by the bank and its practices.
Care they did, and deeply, too. Although the bank’s critics provided a laundry list of the
bank’s transgressions, many of which were fallacious, the legislative committee recommending the
annulment of the bank’s charter stated “that the accumulation of enormous wealth in the hands of
a society who claim perpetual duration, will necessarily produce a degree of influence and power,
which cannot be entrusted in the hands of any one sett [sic] of men whatsoever, without endangering
the public safety” (Carey 1786, p. 52). Further, the bank, which was envisioned by Congress as an
arm of government, was no longer dependent on that government and thus without an effective
check on its operations.
2 Because the bank’s president, Thomas Willing, and other officers and
supporters, including Morris, failed to take the legislature’s annulment threat seriously, few
arguments in support of the bank were offered until the matter was all but decided. The breadth of
opposition to the bank took its supporters by surprise. The vote to annul was lopsided as legislators
from every region of the state, including Philadelphia, voted against the bank. Outside the
legislature, criticism came from all quarters: farmers and mechanics opposed it because it confined
its loans to mercantile firms and mercantile firms on whom the bank did not bestow its favors
opposed it for its favoritism. 
The ink on the act annulling the charter was barely dry before plans to have the charter
restored were put in motion. Robert Morris and two of the bank’s other directors successfully ran3 Blodgett is quoted in Dorfman (1946, p. 338).
4 It is ironic that legislators voted into office by the fraction of the potential electorate
who met the property requirement for voting spoke against voting rights allocated by wealth. It
was the case, of course, that once a man met the property requirement, he received only one vote
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for legislative seats. Their election and a simultaneous mass petitioning campaign asking for
reinstatement of the charter guaranteed that the issue would be revisited. Carey’s (1786)
transcription of the legislative debates offers a window into contemporary attitudes about republican
government and whether it could survive economic modernization. The foundational political
disagreement centered not on favoritism in lending or the bank’s opposition to a state loan office and
the emission of bills of credit, but on the internal governance of the bank, which reflected wider
concerns with the nature of republican governance writ large. If the corporation was, as Samuel
Blodgett insisted, a “moneyed commonwealth” within a commonwealth, a “moneyed republic”
within a republic, then the nature of corporate governance reflected on the possibilities and the
pitfalls of political governance.
3  
What were the governance features inside the bank that so offended republican sensibilities?
Two features of the bank’s internal operations – one share-one vote and the absence of any
mechanism to ensure the rotation in office for directors – became recurring themes of the debate.
Assemblymen Lollar and Smilie attacked the one share-one vote rule directly because it
concentrated power, a practice that Smilie argued was “highly dangerous” because it would
inevitably lead to “direct tyranny” by the large shareholders over the small (Carey 1786, p. 109). He
raised the rhetoric further by drawing an analogy between the bank and the wider polity, asking
whether members of the assembly would ever agree to vest power in any similarly small group of
men through a voting rule that allocated votes by wealth.
4regardless of how many times over he satisfied the requirement. I thank Eugene White for
pointing this out.
5 Harris (2009) reported that it was the charter of the English East Indies company that
established the one shareholder-one vote rule. It was only later that the voting rule was altered.
The original Bank of England charter also imposed a one shareholder-one vote rule (Redlich
1968). Redlich argued that Americans were aware of the Bank of England rule and purposely
adopted an alternative.
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Most members were undoubtedly aware of the common law of corporations, which
recognized a one shareholder-one vote rule unless the charter or bylaws established an alternative
voting rule.
5 Greater wealth did not establish a basis for multiple votes in the polity, so there was
no reason for it to do so within the corporation. Voting power determined by wealth, in fact, was
likely to spill over into the polity. William Findlay, skilled debater, western Republican, lover of
large beaver hats, and outspoken opponent of the bank, provided an alarming vision of proportional
voting rules. Liberal corporate charters, like that given the bank, created not little republics but
“little aristocracies” that would ultimately “engross all the wealth, power, and influence of the state,”
and if made large enough would first monopolize land holding, then trade and finally the
government itself (Carey 1786, pp. 66-69). 
The failure of the bank’s charter or bylaws to establish a system of rotation among the
directors also smacked of privilege and aristocracy. It conjured up, as Reisman (1987, p. 157)
observed, a vision of aristocrats with permanent, powerful positions. Even more troubling was that
it conjured a “vision of placemen and tax gatherers [or, in this case, usurers] swarming the
countryside .. to support wealthy men in high places.” Moreover, without established term limits
“the bank will remain under the present directors, during their lives, which is a direct tyranny”
(Carey 1786, p. 109).-11-
In his defense of the bank Robert Morris dismissed Republican concerns as “bugaboo”
(Carey 1786, p. 58). Instead of allaying fears of concentrated power, he celebrated it. It might be
true, as charged, that the directors of the bank remained in office for long periods and were elected
by “six or seven men, largely concerned in stock,” but how else might it be? Would it be right for
those with small numbers of shares to have power equal to those with many? “Voting according to
property,” he asserted, “is the only proper mode of election” (Carey 1786, p. 117). If the legislature
was to tamper with the proportional voting rule inside the corporation, it may as well pass an
agrarian law – contemporary code words for radical mass reallocation of land from rich to poor –
and divide all property equally. Such would be the tyranny of the small shareholders over the large
and, ultimately, the poor over the rich. So Morris, too, believed the debate over internal corporate
governance was about something deeper and more fundamental than corporate governance per se.
If corporate governance, as constituted in the BONA charter at least, was a mirror in which to view
the potentialities of republican governance generally, Morris liked what he saw inside the bank; his
opponents feared it.
The BONA’s proponents carried the day, however. The act annulling the charter was itself
annulled, but the legislature imposed several new restrictions on the bank, among them a 14-year
charter, and stricter limits on the amount and type of assets it might hold, most notably a restriction
on land ownership except what was needed to operate the bank. The new charter did not overturn
the one share-one vote rule, but under pressure the bank’s shareholders adopted a bylaw that
established an upper limit on the number of votes a single shareholder could cast. 
To modern sensibilities, the late-eighteenth century debate over the corporation seems a
tempest in a teapot. To contemporaries, however, the concern was very real. Historians note-12-
contemporary beliefs that republics were inherently fragile. The risks were so great and the prospect
of failure so ever present, that the institutions of modernity, including the corporation and all it
represented, spelled its eventual but certain doom (Lewis 1993, p.117). Findlay and Jefferson were
products of an eighteenth-century political tradition that saw the political world as “consensual,
deferential, and elitist” in which the citizens agreed to be led by men of talent and social standing
who in turn agreed to protect the citizenry from the consequences of faction and privilege (Lienesch
1993, p. 324). Leaders walked the razor’s edge of fair governance and corruption. Modern
influences, notably the corporation, threatened to corrupt the healthy republic (Wood 1993, p. 411).
Hundreds of petitioners opposed to the bank complained that the bankers, though in business
for only a short time, had already begun to acquire inordinate influence in “public councils” (Bouton
2007, p. 111). That they had thwarted the chartering of a competitor and had delayed, and nearly
stopped, passage of the loan office act, demonstrated that a small number of men might subvert
popular rule. Republican government was at risk because a few large shareholders and their
representatives – directors not subject to popular election – could establish a shadow government
out of reach of popular control. 
  The modern conception of representative democracy as one in which multiple interest groups
vie with one another in shaping policy had not yet revealed itself to late-eighteenth century
politicians, Federalist No. 10 notwithstanding. Most Americans, including those in power or
aspiring to it, whether Federalist or Republican, believed in a “unitary, definable public good and
common purpose that could be discerned and articulated by virtuous and selfless men” (Sharp 1993,
p. 89). This approach became what later historians labeled the politics of the absolute, or the belief
that there was a single, definable objective and that dissent emerged not from a legitimate and-13-
alternate view of the public good, but from a desire to undermine the republic and subvert the
constitution (Elkins and McKitrick 1993). 
Parties and other political groups developed not to broker between myriad interests – such
as a group of profit-seeking capitalists who sought exclusive, corporate banking privileges and an
opposing group who sought a state-subsidized, mortgage-based loan office –  but to preserve the true
legacy of the Revolution. John Taylor and his Republican friends, therefore, saw themselves less
as an emergent political party than a “band of patriots” who had temporarily joined together to
protect the country from the treachery of the few (Sharp 1993, p. 135). Thus Jefferson could, in
reflecting on Hamilton, praise his opponent for being a “singular and honest character,” but one who
was “so bewitched & perverted by the British example, as to be under thoro’ conviction that
corruption was essential to the government of a nation” (quoted in Lewis 1993, p. 123). 
An appreciation of the political debates of the 1780s matters because only in understanding
it can later state banking policies be understood. Although modern political parties had not yet
emerged by the time the original thirteen states started chartering banks, the battle lines were already
sharply drawn. What would later be labeled “Federalist” or “Republican” found expression in the
Pennsylvania debates transcribed by Carey. Moreover, Carey’s decision to publish the transcripts
put the debate on the national stage and provided the foundational arguments for two or three
subsequent generations of banking proponents and critics alike. When Sullivan (1792) attacked the
Massachusetts Bank, he expressed many of the same concerns in the same terms as those raised in
the BONA debates. The bank was run by a handful of Boston’s wealthiest families; it favored
insiders; and the legislative charter had failed to place any meaningful restrictions on it. Like the
revisions to the BONA charter in 1786, the Massachusetts Bank’s charter was amended in 1792 in-14-
an attempt to place more effective limits its corporate powers. That same year Massachusetts
incorporated the Union Bank, the charter of which can only be read as a legislative attempt to
balance the growing demand for commercial banking with democratic principles. Instead of dividing
the Union Bank’s capital stock into $400 (par) shares, as it had done with the Massachusetts Bank,
its $800,000 capital was divided into $8 (par) shares to disperse shareholding as widely as possible.
It was an everyman’s bank and, therefore, neither as prone to insider favoritism nor as dire a threat
to the republic. We now turn to the influence of Hamilton’s Bank of the United States. Where
Morris’s Bank of North America opened the door for commercial banking, it was Hamilton’s Bank
of the United States that established it broad outlines for the next half century or more. 
3. Hamilton’s Legacy: The Bank of the United States and Early State Banking Policy
Like Morris a decade earlier, when Hamilton assumed leadership of the Treasury
Department, he was bedeviled by three questions of public finance: How would the government
raise revenues? How would the government raise funds in anticipation of future revenues? And how
would it transfer funds from the place of collection to the place of disbursement? Hamilton’s
answers comprised what Sylla (1998) labeled the three pillars of the Federalist financial revolution.
Hamilton’s plan included, among other features, domestic taxes and import tariffs, the assumption,
consolidation and re-funding of the remaining Congressional and state Revolutionary-era debts into
federal debt, and the establishment of the Bank of the United States (hereafter BUS). 
Hamilton produced a number of documents in support of his plan, but it was his Report on
the Bank that is considered groundbreaking by some (Cowen 2000; Wright and Cowen 2006). A
national bank, Hamilton argued, was  indispensable to the “prosperous administration of the6 Redlich (1968) highlighted Hamilton’s reliance on Smith’s examples and parallels in
language between the relevant passages of Hamilton’s Report and Smith’s Wealth of Nations.
7 Interestingly, later in the Report Hamilton recommends that the charter include a
provision for the establishment of branches. Instead of inconsistency, these seemingly
contradictory statements probably mean that Hamilton was uncomfortable with the establishment
of branches at the outset, but anticipated their eventual utility.
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finances, and would be of the greatest utility in the operations connected with the support of the
public credit” (Clarke and Hall 1832, p. 15). His Report did not represent Hamilton’s first thinking
about a bank. He had previously corresponded with Robert Morris about the desirability of a
national bank and he was the principal author of the Bank of New York’s 1784 articles of
association (Hammond 1957, Redlich 1968). 
Hamilton’s Report reveals a student of history, contemporary theory and, importantly,
contemporary domestic politics. Hamilton discussed the advantages of Dutch, Italian and English
banks and how those advantages would accrue to Americans. His discourse is clearly influenced by
Adam Smith’s writings.
6 More important for its long-term influence on corporate governance and
state banking policy, Hamilton crafted his proposal cognizant of the political arguments raised
during the 1785 Pennsylvania debates and elsewhere.
So what was Hamilton’s plan for a national bank? He began with a discussion of what the
bank should not be. First, it should be a bank without branches or, at least, far-flung branches.
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Branches would be too difficult to manage, especially in the bank’s formative years, and these
difficulties would inevitably undermine public confidence in the bank. Second, it should not be a
land or mortgage bank. It was important that the national bank be a specie-based commercial bank
that could realize and liquidate its assets promptly. Third, it should not be a wholly state-owned
bank. Hamilton understood the importance of private interest and believed that the profit motive-16-
should guide its operations. Nevertheless, it was imperative that the government was a part owner
so that it could receive dividends and exercise some direction or management. Finally, the bank
should not be without supervision. A vital element of Hamilton’s plan was that some officer of the
state, preferably the Treasury secretary, should retain the right to conduct inquiries and inspect its
books (Clarke and Hall 1832, p. 30). 
// Table 1 about here //
The features of the 1791 BUS charter are provided in Table 1, and can be usefully divided
into general provisions, regulations, and governance rules. The general provisions include features
such as the capitalization and share value described in Section 1, how, when and where the shares
would be subscribed and paid for (§2), the time limit of the charter (§3), the reservation of shares
for the government (§11) and the promise to not charter a competing bank for the duration of the
BUS’s charter (§12). Regulatory provisions included such features as Section 7.8, which forbade
the bank from trading in real estate, section 7.9 that limited its banknote issues, section 7.10 that
restricted its dealings in public debt, as well as sections 8 and 9 that prescribed punishments for
violations of these restrictions. Finally, and perhaps, most importantly, the charter included  several
conditions – found mostly in Sections 4 and 7 – that established internal governance procedures for
the bank. Internal governance rules, as was evident in the BONA debates, not only affected
shareholders and managers but influenced the perceptions of outsiders. 
The BUS charter became the model that many legislatures followed in drafting state bank
charters and, therefore, shaped the contractual relationship between hundreds of banks and the states8 Redlich (1968, p. 21) recognized this fact when he wrote: “the tendency to model
charters of newer banks on those of certain older ones led to integration. In fact some bank
charters became models to whole groups of banks in the same state and even elsewhere.”
Redlich was correct, but he failed to trace the influence back to the BUS charter and how it
shaped state banking policy or how it influenced financial sector performance. Space limitations
prohibit me from pursuing an analysis of the latter as well. I leave that to future research. 
9 Bodenhorn (2006) argued that free banking represented a fundamental break from
previous banking policy and, by implication, a reordering of the relationship between the state
and the financial sector.
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in which they operated.
8 The nature of these contracts determined how well banks performed their
intermediation functions and how they responded (or failed to respond) to contemporary political
and economic circumstances. This is not to diminish the BUS as an important agent of Treasury’s
fiscal policy or independent monetary policy. Those features of the BUS have been explored
elsewhere (Holdsworth and Dewey 1910; Timberlake 1978; Kaplan 1999; Sylla, Wright and Cowen
[forthcoming]). What is less well appreciated is the fundamental role the BUS – and by implication
Hamilton – played in shaping state banking policy up to the adoption of free banking by several
states after 1837 and, ultimately, by the federal government in 1863.
9 
// Table 2 about here //
The extent to which the BUS charter influenced state bank policy becomes evident by even
a casual reading of Table 2, which lists 25 features of the BUS charter and their appearance in the
charters of four banks organized prior to the establishment of the BUS in 1791 and 4 banks chartered
thereafter. Some variant of the most basic general provisions appear in the earliest bank charters (or
articles of association), including the total capital, the number of shares and the grant of corporate
status. Few restrictions appear in the pre-1791 charters. It is particularly notable that the earliest
bank organizers imposed  relatively few internal governance rules on themselves. Compared to the-18-
BUS charter, the governance rules were a patchwork and tended to the innocuous, such as the
requirement that directors stood for annual reelection. It is notable that not one of the pre-BUS banks
afforded shareholders the right to call extraordinary meetings. Of course, banks might provide some
of the governance features not included in their charters through bylaws or other internal operating
rules, but bylaws provided a lesser guarantee that investors would ever realize a return on their
investment (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Directors might change bylaws whenever they no longer
suited the directors’ purposes so that, compared to explicit charter provisions, internal rules were
a second-best guarantee of shareholder rights at best. 
The influence of the BUS charter on state banking policy becomes apparent when we
consider the charters of post-BUS banks. Although the banks listed in Table 2 were not randomly
selected, they are indicative of the wide and long-lasting influence of the BUS charter. Nearly every
charter imposed a time limit, required regular reports of condition to the government, and reserved
some shares for the state. Every legislature reserved the right, most implicitly, to charter other banks.
There are similar commonalities between the BUS and the state banks in the restrictions placed on
banks’ activities and in the basic corporate governance rules. The remainder of this chapter
investigates the logic underlying the general, regulatory and governance provisions included in the
charters.
3.1 General provisions and state banking policy
It is notable that, in his 24-point plan for a bank in his Report, Hamilton accepted a de facto
term limit for the BUS (p.31) when earlier in the document he dismissed the suggestion that the
BONA become the national bank because in accepting its Pennsylvania charter it had “rendered10 The famous Dartmouth College case (Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4
Wheaton [1819]) had not yet been decided. In Dartmouth College, the Supreme Court of the
United States held that corporate grants were protected under the contract clause of the federal
Constitution. Once granted, governments had limited power to amend charters.
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[itself] a mere bank of a particular state, liable to dissolution at the expiration of fourteen years” (p.
26). That it faced the prospect of another contentious rechartering debate in 1800 rendered the
BONA unfit to be a national bank. Why did legislatures impose term limits on banks? At least three
reasons, two philosophical and one practical, present themselves. In the 1785 BONA debates, one
of the principal objections of the bank’s critics was its perpetual charter. Under the theory that a
charter represented an inviolable contract between a state and a corporation, a perpetual charter was
troublesome because it placed the corporation beyond effective legislative control. When this
concern was raised by some Pennsylvania legislators in the 1782 during the debate over the BONA’s
original charter, their fears were allayed when they were assured that any subsequent legislature
could amend the charter at will (Rappaport 1970, p. 26).
Contemporary belief accorded with pre-Dartmouth College views that the state retained
absolute power over corporations.
10 In 1784, in fact, the Pennsylvania legislature rejected the
contract theory of corporate charter when the College of Pennsylvania claimed that amendments
made to its charter were unconstitutional. During the College debate, one member expressly argued
that such could not be true because if it were, the legislature had no control over BONA “a monster
of weight and influence” (quoted in Rappaport 1970, p. 82). In short, some contemporaries objected
to perpetual charters because, in granting them, the state surrendered its power over a subordinate
“body politic.” Regular recontracting placed the state in the superior position and afforded it regular
opportunities to rein in a corporation. John Taylor of Caroline was not along in his fear that a11 It is notable that Madison was less enthusiastic about regular rewriting of laws than
Jefferson. Madison, in fact, viewed the prospect of rewriting laws every 19 years with alarm
(Sloan 1993, p. 300; see Madison to Jefferson, 4 February 1790). The difference in approach
between the two probably reflects Madison’s pragmatism born of his more extensive legislative
experience. It was also the case that some present improvements were of sufficient magnitude
that it was efficient to burden future generations with some of their costs.
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corporation might hide behind its charter, outlive its original purpose, and threaten the republic
(Conkin 1980, p. 65).
A second philosophical objection to a perpetual charter is summarized in Jefferson’s oft-
quoted phrase that “the Earth belongs in usufruct to the living.” This idea, which Jefferson set out
in a letter to James Madison, reflected a fundamental tenet of contemporary Republican political
philosophy that each generation owed to its successors the freedom to make their own choices
(Sloan 1993). Because it was easier to renew good laws than repeal bad ones, it was imperative that
laws be written with limited duration. Even bad laws have a constituency, Jefferson observed (Sloan
1993, p. 284). Automatic expiration was necessary and, because Jefferson had calculated the length
of a generation as 19 years, every law should expire approximately every 20 years. It is not
surprising then that the BUS charter and many that followed expired 20 years after enactment. As
time passed, terms lengthened to 30 or even 40 years, but term limits became institutionalized in
bank charters.
11
A third reason for charter term limits reflects the states’ ongoing search for sources of
revenue. State governments quickly learned that prospective bankers were willing to pay for bank
charters. Sometimes banks paid by providing the state with shares in the newly chartered company
for free or at a reduced rate so that the state treasury would receive dividends. The charter of the
Farmers’ Bank of Virginia, for example, required that the bank give the state shares. Sometimes12 Not surprisingly, this system also led to legislative corruption and bribery (Bodenhorn
2006).
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banks paid with direct “bonus” payments to the legislature, such as the Philadelphia Bank’s payment
of $135,000 in 1803 after a contentious political battle to obtain its charter (Schwartz 1947). By
comparison, the South Carolina Bank paid the bargain price of $15,000 in 1801. At other times
banks filled the state treasuries through taxes on capital (Massachusetts) or dividends
(Pennsylvania). By the 1820s banks had emerged as the most important revenue source for many
states (Sylla et al 1987).   
In reserving one-fifth of the shares of the BUS for itself, the federal government became the
largest residual claimant to the profits of the country’s single largest enterprise. Several states
followed suit. Virginia, for example, subscribed to shares in the Bank of Virginia, whose charter was
modeled closely after the BUS charter. North Carolina and Kentucky later followed Virginia’s
example.  The state, in effect, created local monopolies or oligopolies and then extracted some
fraction of the banks’ rents and returned them to the taxpayer.
12 Rational, forward-looking legislators
recognized that the stream of future rents was uncertain and that risk averse prospective bankers
might underbid for a charter. In taking a direct ownership stake, the state ensured that it received a
proportionate share of the rents. But other states did not take direct ownership stakes and found other
mechanisms, such as bonus payments, to extract rents at the outset.  By forcing the bankers to come
back to renegotiate their agreements on a regular basis, the state could better tailor the bonus
payment to the current needs of the treasury. In 1830, for example, the Pennsylvania legislature, then
busy finding ways to fund the state’s massive canal-building project, rechartered the Bank of
Pennsylvania. Under the terms of the new charter, the bank was required to lend the state $4 million-22-
dollars at below-market rates. Moreover, the bank was forced to accept the responsibility of
maintaining the transfer books for the state debt. Providing this uncompensated service to the state
treasury cost the bank an estimated $9000 per year over the next two decades (Holdsworth 1928,
pp. 148-50).
Hamilton’s plan was generally sound and well reasoned, but not all of the BUS’s charter
provisions set a good example and at least one – the provision allowing the federal government to
borrow its subscription and repay it over ten years – set a bad example and established the precedent
for paying for subscriptions through stock notes. Stock notes arose when the subscribing shareholder
borrowed from the bank, using the subscribed stock as collateral, to pay the next instalment on the
stock. Critics claimed that this system undermined the very premise of a bank’s capital, which was
supposed to be contributed by the shareholders with money to lend rather than created through a
credit transaction (Raguet 1840; Holdsworth 1928). Despite contemporary concerns, stock notes
were widely used. In 1824, a Maine legislative committee found that nearly 69 percent of the capital
of 6 banks was made up of stock notes (Chadbourne 1936, p. 12). Similarly, in 1831 New York’s
bank commissioners expressed grave concerns over the use of stock notes. They feared that the
practice encouraged men of limited means and dubious character to take control of a weak bank and
defraud the other shareholders and the public (New York 1831, p. 30). Kentucky and South Carolina
law expressly forbade the practice and further forbade the payment of any loan through the direct
surrender of the bank’s stock (Morehead and Brown 1834, p. 209). On the other hand, in order to
encourage private investment in the State Bank, Indiana  loaned up to $32.50 toward the $50 share
subscription price. These were just stock notes once removed because the state borrowed on its own
account to subsidize private subscribers.-23-
Although it was subject to abuse, the use of stock notes was not necessarily bad practice. In
the early nineteenth century, specie was scarce and requiring payment of stock subscription
instalments with specie would have slowed the development of a banking industry. Thus some
subscriptions were paid with state or federal bonds; others were paid with stock notes. Even
Hammond (1957, p. 124), who was not loathe to criticize contemporary bank policy, contended that
complaints about the use of stock notes were “unrealistic and inconsistent.” Finding useful
alternatives to specie reflected American pragmatism. If Americans had allowed the chronic
shortage of specie to retard the formation of banks, the circle of capital shortages and
underdevelopment observed in other economies might have plagued the United States as well. The
pretense of the stock note encouraged the creation of banking services that stimulated trade and
growth (Bodenhorn 2003, p. 22).
3.2 Portfolio and other restrictions
The second set of regulatory provisions included in the BUS charter directly or indirectly
influenced the conditions under which state banks functioned. Most of the regulations reflect either
contemporary common sense or political concerns. The common-sense restrictions included
requirements that officers with fiduciary responsibilities post surety bonds, that branches be allowed,
and that the bank provide regular reports of condition to some state officer or agency. The
requirement that the bank continuously redeem its notes in specie imposed market discipline on
banks (Calomiris and Kahn 1991). Banknote holders with a redemption option had incentives to
monitor banks and created incentives for banks to maintain adequate specie reserves. If market
incentives broke down, the BUS charter limited the bank’s debts, exclusive of deposits, to two times-24-
its paid-in capital. The continuous redemption clause and the two-times-capital clause are nearly
universal elements of subsequent bank charters. These restrictions did not appear in the four pre-
BUS charters (see Table 2).
Limitations on non-bank assets and the prohibition on dealing in anything other than bills
of exchange, specie and bullion were included so that the bank would neither accumulate large land
holdings nor compete with merchants. In his arguments against BONA in 1785 William Findlay
argued that because the bank’s capital was so large, there was little that stood in the way of its
monopolizing trade or land ownership (Carey 1786, p. 69). To these men who equated land
ownership and political participation, land ownership by banks presented a frightening prospect
because it was a short step from control of large tracts of land to control of government itself.
Morris was probably correct in calling this argument a “bugaboo,” but Findlay’s concern resonated.
Many, if not most state bank charters granted through the first half of the nineteenth century
included some variation on the following: 
The said company shall not purchase or hold any lands, tenements or other real estate, other
than what may be necessary for the convenient transaction of its business, unless such lands,
tenements and real estate shall have been bona fide mortgaged to the company by way of
security, or conveyed to it in satisfaction of debt previously contracted in the course of
dealings, or purchased to secure debts contracted with or due to the company.... (Laws of the
State of Missouri 1825, p. 179).
In other words, banks were allowed to own the lot on which their banking house was located, they
could take possession of real estate signed over as security for a defaulted loan, or they could
purchase collateralized property at sheriffs’ sales that might otherwise fetch less than the defaulting
borrower’s debt. Some states found even these restrictions insufficiently strict because banks might
still accumulate large blocks of real estate through a wave of defaults. To guard against such a-25-
possibility, Kentucky required banks to divest of any seized lands within five years of their having
taken possession. If they failed to do so, the lands escheated to the commonwealth (Morehead and
Brown 1834, p. 209).
Other restrictions on bank dealings reflected local concerns. Article VII of the Bank of New
York’s articles of association is curious in that it prohibits the bank from dealing in foreign
exchange. Foreign and domestic exchange dealings later became the mainstay of money center
banks and a business that encouraged the integration of the country’s regional financial markets
(Bodenhorn 1992; 2000). But in 1784 foreign exchange was the province of the city’s large
international merchants and they were not prepared to support the incorporation of a potential
competitor (Redlich 1968, p. 28). Some variation on this clause reappears in dozens of state bank
charters. The charter of the Bank of Missouri, for example, provides that the bank “shall in no case
be owners [sic] of any ship or vessel” and the charter of the Planters’ and Mechanics’ Bank of South
Carolina forbade the bank trading in any product of the land (cotton) or public debt (Laws of the
State of Missouri 1825; McCord 1840). The prohibition on cotton dealing insulated cotton factors
from competition, while the prohibition on dealing in public debts protected existing stock and note
traders. It was clear that banks were to facilitate trade; they were not to compete with traders. 
The other notable restrictions included in the charter limited the bank’s lending to both
foreign and domestic governments. Concerns with the bank trading with foreign governments were
first articulated during the 1785 BONA debates. Contemporaries feared that foreign share ownership
and lending to foreign governments would allow the bank to “become subject to foreign influence”
(Carey 1786, p. 56). Jefferson charged that, should a foreign power with whom hostilities broke out
be indebted to the bank, the bank might intercede on the foreign power’s behalf to protect its-26-
investment. Banks had no business in foreign affairs and the best way to avoid that eventuality was
to have no truck with foreigners. Again, such statements reveal contemporary beliefs about the
inherent fragility of representative democracy and the difficulties it would face internally and
globally.
Hamilton did not explain why he thought it proper to limit bank lending to domestic
governments, but he may have been concerned with independent executive action. At the federal
level, tax and spending bills must originate in the House. If the executive could borrow large sums
from banks to fund a pet project, the power to do so would afford him a de facto spending initiative.
And because the state would be contractually obligated to repay the loan, the executive’s action
would demand the imposition of future taxes without the prior consent of elected representatives.
Similar concerns appear in the debates surrounding the establishment of the Bank of England in
1694, and a clause was inserted in its charter prohibiting the Crown from borrowing without express
consent by Parliament (Andréadès 1909). Early in the century the borrowing limit imposed
meaningful restrictions on the executive. The charter of the BUS, for instance, limited total
unauthorized borrowing to just $100,000, which represented a small fraction of the federal budget
even in the 1790s. Each charter issued by Maryland, however, contained a $50,000 limit on the
executive without express legislative authorization. When there were only two  banks, a $50,000 per
bank limit was a binding constraint. But with 11 banks by 1810 Maryland’s $50,000 limit no longer
represented the constraint it had earlier. The governor might borrow and bind the taxpayers to the
repayment of substantial amounts without taxpayer assent. Thus, the borrowing limit included in
each charter offered less protection as banks proliferated, which may explain why the clause
disappeared in the 1820s in Maryland and elsewhere.-27-
3.3 Governance rules and their spread
The final set of rules Hamilton incorporated into the BUS charter and that spread through
state charters were governance rules, many of which were a direct response to objections leveled at
the BONA’s internal governance structure during the 1785 debates. Three features raised the
greatest concerns: rotation in office for directors, proxy voting rules, and the one share-one vote rule.
Hamilton’s Report and the BUS charter addressed all three. 
In his Report Hamilton detailed his objections to having the BONA become the federal bank.
As we have already seen, one concern was that the bank’s charter was due to expire in 1800 and,
given the intensity of the 1785 debates and the continued ill-will harbored by some toward the bank,
he feared for its recharter. The “want of a principle of rotation” among the directors was a second
concern. Here again, contemporaries drew analogies between civic and corporate governance.
Hamilton acknowledged the potential gains from longer experience in managing a bank, but because
bank management was “regulated by a few simple fixed maxims, the application of which is [sic]
not difficult to any man of judgment,” it was better that the bank sacrifice some key personnel from
time to time than lose public confidence (Clarke and Hall 1832, p. 27). Because the bank’s directors
would not be elected by the larger electorate but by a smaller group of wealthy elites, it was easy
to imagine an institution fallen under the sway of a few men, which would ultimately “excite distrust
and discontent” (Clarke and Hall 1832, p. 27). A lack of rotation, combined with the secrecy
necessary in decision making, would invite conspiracy theories and undermine the bank as an arm
of government. Hamilton’s effort to balance managerial continuity and turnover led him to
recommend that one-fourth of the board not stand for reelection each year. The exception was the
President, elected from the board by the board, who could retain his presidency so long as-28-
shareholders elected him to the board and the board elected him president. 
Lines 17 and 18 of Table 2 reveal that annual elections and a rotation clause like that
appearing in the BUS charter did not appear in pre-BUS charters, but became nearly universal for
a decade or so afterward. By the 1810s and 1820s, when fears over corporate subversion of
democracy abated somewhat, the clauses appear less often. The disappearance of the rotation clause
from bank charters may also reflect that such clauses had few teeth. Although a rotation clause
forced out one-fourth of the board in any given year, extant evidence on board composition reveals
long-term membership. Not surprisingly, three-fourths of bank boards remained in place for
extended periods while one-fourth experienced turnover. It is unlikely that the short-tenured one-
fourth offered significant leadership in the face of an entrenched board of old timers.
Voting rights, especially how votes would be cast and by whom, represented a second critical
governance feature outlined in the Report and in the BUS charter. It turned out that shareholders
resident in the United States could vote in person or by proxy. Foreign shareholders were excluded
from exercising any control rights. They retained their residual rights, but were unable to directly
influence management. “Due caution,” wrote Hamilton, was called for in order to “guard against a
foreign influence insinuating itself” into the bank (Clarke and Hall 1832, p.28).
Item 11 of the Report recommended proxy voting. During debate on the BUS bill, Rep.
Smith of South Carolina asked that the bill be recommitted (ibid, p. 37). Smith had several
objections, among them the clause excluding foreigners from voting by proxy. He considered the
exclusion exceptional and worthy of additional debate. Yet no further discussion of proxy voting
by foreigners or otherwise is found in the transcripts of the ensuing debate. Contemporaries
recognized that liberal voting rights assured stockholders that managers could not substantially-29-
modify the terms of the stockholders’ investment without their consent. Voting rights were to
stockholders what covenants were to bond holders: they limited managerial discretion and protected
against expropriation (Baum 1997; La Porta et al. 1998). Of course occasions might arise when
substantial modifications to the agreement might benefit stockholders so that gaining their consent
was vital for profit maximization. Because share holding was widely dispersed, renegotiations would
be costly to organize and mediate. Proxy voting reduced the costs of gaining majority consent and
effecting change in corporate policy. Charter clauses allowing proxy voting are missing from all pre-
1792 charters. After the clause is included in the BUS charter, the clause becomes ubiquitous in state
bank charters. In this instance, the BUS influence on state banking policy is unmistakable.
A system of voting rights that Hamilton labeled the “prudent mean” represented a third
important governance feature included in the BUS charter that spread through state banking systems.
The BONA debates highlighted the gravity with which contemporaries viewed corporate voting.
“Like civic governance,” wrote Dunlavy (2006), “corporate governance has many dimensions, but
there are good reasons to single out voting rights as its foundation.” Dunlavy (2006) classified
voting rights along a continuum from “plutocratic” (one share-one vote)  to “democratic” (one
shareholder-one vote), with infinite variations in between. Hamilton labeled one point along the
continuum the “prudent mean,” which he defined with the following voting rule:
For one share, and not more than two shares, one vote; for every two shares above two, and
not exceeding ten, one vote; for every four shares above ten, and not exceeding thirty, one
vote; for every six shares above thirty, and not exceeding sixty, one vote; for every eight
shares above sixty, and not exceeding one hundred, one vote; and for every ten shares above
one hundred, one vote; but no person, co-partnership, or body politic, shall be entitled to a
greater number than thirty votes (Clarke and Hall 1832, p. 32).
Hamilton offered his prudent mean voting rule because he considered the one share-one vote rule-30-
adopted by the BONA “improper” and the one shareholder-one vote rule “not less erroneous”
(Clarke and Hall 1832, p. 28). 
The plutocratic rule of one share-one vote increased the likelihood that a few stockholders
might monopolize the bank’s governance and resources. It is important to note that Hamilton was
equally concerned with how the bank’s political power and economic resources might be marshaled
to the detriment not only of small shareholders, but of electorate more generally. Hamilton
recognized that his proposed bank – the Bank of the United States – was “not a mere matter of
private property, but a political machine of the greatest importance to the State” (ibid, p. 28). It was
on this issue that Morris and Hamilton’s opinions diverged about the connections between bank and
state. Morris viewed his Bank of North America as an independent, private corporation that would
assist the government on occasion. Hamilton, on the other hand, conceived of his Bank of the United
States as a public corporation that would use its resources in the advancement of  government policy
and, secondarily, assist private agents by facilitating mercantile activities. Because the BUS was to
be closely connected to the executive branch through the Treasury Department, Hamilton recognized
its inherently political nature. In adopting a prudent mean voting rule, Hamilton simultaneously
undermined objections raised against the BONA on account of its plutocratic voting rule and
encouraged investment by offering larger shareholders a greater measure of control over the bank’s
operations than a purely democratic rule would have afforded.
Although one share-one vote rules were common by the end of the nineteenth century
(Morris’s view had prevailed), at the beginning of the century most Americans remained wary of
power vested with large shareholders under one share-one vote rules and, instead, adopted rules
more akin to Hamilton’s prudent mean (Dunlavy 2006).  Lines 21 and 21a in Table 2, again, reveal13 The source of voting rule information is the author’s database of governance rules
included in antebellum bank charters. Future research includes matching those governance rules
to bank performance measures to determine the extent to which alternative governance
provisions influenced bank operations.
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BUS influence on American corporate governance, at least for the first half of the nineteenth
century. None of the pre-BUS charters adopted prudent mean rules. Many, but not all banks, adopted
it thereafter. As a measure of the limits placed on large stockholders, Line 21a reports the number
of votes a stockholder holding 25 shares was allowed to cast at a stockholder’s meeting. While the
Hartford Bank adopted the one share-one vote rule, the other banks adopted rules that gave a
shareholder with 25 shares only nine votes – the same rule imposed on stockholders in the BUS.
Variations quickly appeared: stockholders with 25 shares could cast 8 votes at shareholder meetings
in New Jersey,  10 votes at meetings in New Hampshire, 11 votes in Ohio, 12 or 13 in Missouri, but
only 6 in Georgia. Connecticut developed no hard and fast rule, but rather responded to the
organizers’ wishes. Only two of the first ten banks chartered in Connecticut adopted prudent mean
voting rules. The other eight adopted one share-one vote rules.
13
Since Berle and Means (1933) famously argued that shareholders had ceded effective control
over the corporation to managers, much of the scholarly corporate governance literature has focused
on the consequences of vertical relations within the corporation. Less attention was focused on
horizontal relations within the firm, especially relations between shareholders. But once scholars
recognized that large block shareholding might  improve managerial performance because large
block shareholders would have greater incentives to monitor, they also recognized that large block
holdings come at a cost: large shareholders might adopt rules or policies that disadvantage or
expropriate from small shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Holderness and Sheehan 2000).-32-
Because owners and managers were not separate in the eighteenth and nineteenth-century
corporation, concerns with vertical relations were clearly subsidiary to concerns with horizontal
relations among shareholders.
Differential voting rights and other governance rules distributed power among shareholders
in meaningful ways. The fact that different corporations adopted alternative rules meant that these
rules mattered to someone. Hamilton’s Report and the subsequent charter of the BUS laid the
foundation for subsequent corporate governance by trying to limit the power of large block
shareholders. It is an empirical question whether these rules were effective, but investigations into
bank share ownership suggest that banks attracted small investors even in the face of large block
holdings (Wright 1999).  Voting rules and other governance measures thus encouraged share
ownership across a broad mass of the American public, which further encouraged bank formation
and financial intermediation more generally. In the end then, Hamilton’s governance rules –
especially his prudent mean voting rule –  promoted economic growth through the encouragement
of widespread share ownership.
3.4 American exceptionalism?
As previously noted, Hamilton, like many of his contemporaries, was a student of history.
In his Report on the Bank he specifically mentions the beneficial consequences of banks in Italy, the
Netherlands and Britain. To what extent did the charters, rules and bylaws governing these banks
shape Hamilton’s thinking about the specifics of the BUS charter and, thus, subsequent US banking
policy. Even a casual reading of the terms of the act creating the Bank of England (known as the
Tonnage Act, 5 & 6 Will. 3, c. 20. ) reveals a direct English influence on Hamilton’s thought.-33-
Interestingly, the English debate mirrored, in one important respect, the BONA debate. While Whigs
were concerned that the Bank of England would lead to “absolute monarchy” because it would
provide the Crown with access to funds outside Parliament’s fiscal control, despite a clause
prohibiting the Crown from direct borrowing. Tories, on the other hand, opposed the bank because
they viewed it as “one step toward a republic, because such institutions [were] not compatible with
a monarchy” (Andréadès 1909, p. 69). Because institutions the size and complexity of the Bank of
England and the BUS were unfamiliar, critics could inhere them with whatever long-term
repercussions as suited their political purposes. 
The specifics of the Bank of England and the BUS charters are too close to have been
coincidental (Andréadès 1909; Francis 1888). The Bank of England was granted an original charter
for 12 years, though Parliament retained the power to annul at will with one year’s notice, a clause
that may have influenced the thinking of Pennsylvania legislators who believed they could rewrite
charters almost at will. Like the BUS and many other American banks, the Bank of England was
prohibited from trading in any merchandise other than bills of exchange, specie and bullion, and
collateral taken for nonpayment of loans. The bank’s charter also adopted specific governance rules
that presage those adopted by Hamilton at the BUS. The charter allowed for 24 directors, 13 of
whom constituted a quorum. Only citizens who owned at least £2,000 in shares could serve as
directors. Directors determined executive compensation without needing shareholder approval. The
bank was required to hold quarterly shareholder meetings. Only those with £500 in shares were
given a vote, and the bank followed the common law rule of one shareholder-one vote. The Bank’s
charter was pro-shareholder in that any nine voting shareholders could call a special shareholder’s
meeting. -34-
Bryan (1899) and Starnes (1931) argued that Scottish rather than English banking provided
the intellectual foundations for the American experience. In making this claim, both drew the
connection because of the encouragement of branch banking from Maryland southward. Although
extensive branching distinguished Scottish from English banking, Conant (1909) contends that the
charters of the Scottish banks were modeled after the Bank of England’s. Established in 1695, the
Bank of Scotland was given a 21-year monopoly, could not trade in merchandise, could not lend to
the government without previous Parliamentary approval, and could not charge more than 6 percent
interest, among other restrictions reminiscent of those imposed on the Bank of England. Did the
Scottish experience influence American banking? It surely did because the Scottish experience
influenced David Hume’s. Sir James Steuart’s and Adam Smith’s thinking about banking and all
three were widely read by the founders. While American banking eventually adopted a uniquely
American cast, it is not at all surprising to find English precedence. Bilder (2004) found that
eighteenth century American legal institutions, both common law and legislative practice, were
deeply influenced by English practice and that, while the two diverged after independence, post-
colonial continuity was the norm. 
4. Conclusion
It is historically inaccurate to think about Federalist banking policy as a clearly articulated
set of objectives, statutes and administrative regulations. Federalist banking policy was an attitude
and a loosely constructed approach to the establishment of and control over financial intermediaries.
The clearest statement of that approach is found in Hamilton’s Report on a National Bank and in the
charter of the Bank of United States. These were the documents that defined two generations of the-35-
contract between states and their banks. Although Hamilton was a student of history, as were many
of his contemporaries, he had limited guidance in how to construct a bank and almost no guidance
in constructing a system. It is clear that the Bank of England charter influenced Federalist
approaches to banking, but the politicians and the bankers of the time were making up much of the
script as they went along. 
This is not to say that the Federalists did not impose some structure on their banks, which
later developed into a banking system. They imposed structure and order through the charters they
granted. Federal policies became state policies because state legislators had the same concerns as
the founders about the relationship between business and government and adopted BUS charter as
a model in creating state systems. It was an organic process and the model evolved over time, of
course, but the Bank of the United States’s DNA remains evident in state bank charters several
generations removed from the 1791 original. Future research should further investigate the evolution
of regulation, supervision and governance of corporations in early America. Such a research agenda
would benefit from the collection and coding of features included in the more than 1,000 banks
chartered between 1782 and 1862. Combining this information with bank-level data would further
illuminate how state policy influenced the quality of intermediation.
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Table 1: Features of Bank of the United States Charter 
Originally Proposed by Hamilton and Adopted by Congress
Charter
Section
Provisions of the Bank of the United States charter (1791)
1 $10 million capital in $400 shares
2 Individual subscriptions limited to 1,000 shares. Shares payable  -- 1/4 in specie, 3/4 in 6% federal
bonds -- in four instalments
3 Bank granted corporate powers for 20 years and may hold up to $15 million in real and personal
property
4 Bank governed by 25 directors subject to annual reelection. President to be chosen from among the
elected directors.
5 Bank may commence as soon as $400,000 in capital is paid in.
6 Directors have power to appoint managers and determine managerial compensation.
7.1 Prudent mean voting rule for shareholders. Only shareholders resident in US could vote by proxy.
7.2 Only 3/4 of existing directors eligible for reelection.
7.3 Directors must be shareholders.
7.4 Directors will not be paid for services unless specifically approved by shareholders.
7.5 Board quorum is 7 directors.
7.6 Any 60 stockholders with a combined 200 shares could call a special meeting of stockholders.
7.7 Officers required to post performance bonds.
7.8 Bank may only so much land as required for the conduct of business or that surrendered in
judgment.
7.9 Bank's debts (banknotes) may not exceed $10 million. Directors are personally liable for any
excess.
7.10 Bank may sell any of the public debt used to purchase shares, but it cannot buy additional bonds.
Its trade will be limited to bills of exchange and specie. Interest charges limited to 6%.
7.11 Loans to state, federal or foreign governments limited without express Congressional consent.
7.12 Stock transferrable by rules adopted by directors.
7.13 Debts signed by president and countersigned by cashier are negotiable and transferable.
7.14 Semi-annual dividends payable from profits at discretion of directors.
7.15 Branch offices may be opened wherever directors see fit.
7.16 Secretary of Treasury may inspect the bank's books at any time, not more often than once each
week.Table 1: Features of Bank of the United States Charter 
Originally Proposed by Hamilton and Adopted by Congress
Charter
Section
Provisions of the Bank of the United States charter (1791)
-43-
8 All officers and directors who trade or authorize trade in goods not allowed by charter are subject
to treble damages.
9 All officers and directors who loan or authorize loans to governments in amounts in excess of
limits are subject to treble damages.
10 Bank's notes are receivable for all debts to United States.
11 President of the United States may, at his discretion, subscribe to one-fifth of the bank's stock. The
bank shall loan the amount to the government.
12 No other bank will be chartered by Congress during the term of the 20-year charter.
Sources: Hamilton's Report reprinted in Clarke and Hall (1832, pp. ). Bank of the United States charter reprinted
in Holdsworth and Dewey (1910, pp. 126-132).-44-
Table 2: Bank of the United States Charter Provisions Adopted by Selected State Banks



























1. Capital stock $300,000 $1m $100,000 $3m $1.2m $800,000
2. Share values $300 $500 $100 $400 $300 $100
3. Corporate status T T TT T TTT
4. Term limit (years) 20 20 20 21
5. Reports to government T TTT
6. State ownership option T T TTT
7. Monopoly charter
Regulations
8. Nonbank assets limits T T TTT
9. Limit on trade in
merchandise TT T T T
10. Performance bonds T TTT
11. Debt limits T T TTT
12. Note redemption TTT TTable 2: Bank of the United States Charter Provisions Adopted by Selected State Banks



























13. Limits on government
lending TT T *
14. Interest rate ceilings T TTT
Governance provisions
15. Large board 12 12 13 9 25 15 15
16. Quorum 7 3 13 9 6
17. Annual reelection TT T TTT
18. Rotation in office T T TTT
19. Director citizenship TT T TTT
20. Directors determine
executive compensation TT T TTT
21. Prudent mean voting TT TTT
21a. Votes for 25 shares 25 25 21 9 25 9 9 9
22. Proxy voting T TTT
23. % of shareholders
necessary to call
meeting
0.03 0.05 0.09Table 2: Bank of the United States Charter Provisions Adopted by Selected State Banks




























from profits T T TTT
Notes: * Lending limited to foreign, bit not domestic governments. 